SACRIFICE AMONG THE LODAGAA AND ELSE WHERE : A COMPARATIVE COMMENT ON IMPLICIT QUESTIONS AND EXPLICIT REJECTIONS par Jack Goody
My initial interest in sacrifice among the LoDagaa, in a work entitled Death, Property and the Ancestors (1962) , was in the specific relation ships, kin relations, between man and god, between donor and recipient (and sacrificer as a third party) which sacrifices to the ancestors involve. This interest paralleled the contemporary concern of many other anthropologists with the phenomenon of witchcraft, in the tri partite relationship between victim, witch (accused) and accuser.
We were primarily interested in what such "ritual" activities could tell us about man-to-man relations, about social relations in that sense and only secondarily in the network of beliefs.
I do not want to discuss the validity of this approach, except to say that the question of the relations between the actors is of obvious significance to offerings, as Robertson Smith perceived (though it applies mainly to sacrifice to the ancestors) ; and it clearly does not inhibit any other form of analysis, i.e. a study of the beliefs "in themselves". One reason for this importance, then and now, is that such an approach offers an opportunity of bringing together (I won't say integrating) certain insights of Freud and Marx, of seeing the relations among men over poverty, office and sex as being fraught with conflict, of using these aspects of religious institutions to determine the nature of the conflicts (as well as the solidarities) in the critical relations of the society concerned, and of analysing the connections between the social and personality systems ( to a lesser extent the cultural) not only within a single society but also in a comparative context. It is a form of analysis associated with the names of Malinowski, Fortes, Gluckman and Nadel, among others ; if it has been neglected in recent years, it is anthropology's loss.
In examining the ancestral sacrifices among the LoDagaa. I argued (on the basis of comparing two different groups) that sacrifice was not a gift, even though I spoke of givers and receivers. The difference between the groups I studied was explained by differences in the control over property. In one society (the LoDagaa or "Dagari"), the matriclans were "corporate" in a particular sense ; it was members of such clans who were the holders, and the inheritors, of movable property, above all of the objects (or subjects) of blood sacrifice, that is, domestic animals. In this kind of sacrifice, a man has to render to the ancestors that which he owes, that is to say, the goods that he has inherited, or that he has acquired through their help and the help of what they have left behind. Hence, the sacrifice is not a gift but the return of a debt ; one is giving the ancestors their due.
This notion of sacrifice seems to me correct for sacrifices to the ancestors. But there are other modalities of sacrifice among the LoDagaa which are somewhat different and which demand other explanations. What I offered was certainly no "theory of sacrifice", an undertaking that seems to me as impossible as a "theory of gift". One cannot justify a single vision or explanation of "sacrifice" even in one society for reasons that seem sufficiently obvious even if rarely understood.
It goes without saying that in my discussion of sacrifice one must not confuse the concepts of the observer with that of the actors.
For the LoDagaa, and in my opinion for many other people in the region, the relations between the two are somewhat tenuous, which makes it difficult to discuss sacrifice as a système de pensée, especially if one has been more concerned with the interpenetration of "thought" and "acts" in a system of action.
We can look at sacrifice as a system of acts or as a system of ideas, although these are not of course alternatives ; ideas in a sense are acts of behaviour and both interlock to form a system of action. A stress upon the acts is justifiable for two reasons. Firstly, acts are more generally standardised than ideas (thoughts about the process of sacrifice seem to be much more variable then the acts themselves). Secondly, one cannot be altogether satisfied at the way Sacrifice among the LoDagaa and elsewhere : a comparative comment 1 1 anthropologists usually specify ideas, not only because they deal with few informants whereas the likelihood of variability makes it necessary to deal with more, not less, than for acts (which usually involve a plurality of participants), but also because they are less likely to gather correct information with their ears, than with their eyes.
For these reasons, the discussion of ideas is more likely to reflect the prejudices, personal and cultural, of the observer. One may wish to describe this approach as smacking of empiricism ; it might also be seen as displaying proper scholarly caution.
We can also look at sacrifice from the actor's and the observer's standpoints. The first must of course be the basis of the second, and is important in its own right. But to remain at the ethno-methodological level, or even to present a more "coherent" (i.e. constructed) cultural account, is not (for me) the end game. It is the sociological and par ticularly the comparative sociological explanation which I find most interesting ; this does not mean I want to explain away religious insti tutions but that I want to uncover any systematic links with other aspects of socio-cultural systems, at whatever level.
In the discussion of observers, there are two general usages of "sacrifice", one wider (inclusive), the other narrower (exclusive) :
The semantic field of "sacrifice" (observer term)
A. ritual, ceremony, act of man-god communication involving B. the offering, especially the slaughter, of a domestic animal.
What are equivalent concepts at the actor level ?
The nearest equivalent of the word "sacrifice" in LoDagaa is maala bagr (or bggr), same word as in Bagre, "the Myth of the Bagre", the name of a secret association, and the same as the Tallensi concept of bagr (Fortes 1949) , though in the latter case the term refers rather to the altar at the point of contact, to avoid the overstretched word "communication". I have translated the term bagr, not altogether satisfactorily, as "mystical trouble". A sacrifice is in effect always preceded by the act of divination (the diviner is known as the bagbuura, he who seeks the bagr), which involves the manipulation of a set of cowries and a series of tokens and which always (or virtually always)
points the way to a sacrifice at an altar. The English word "token", in one of its senses, is very precisely what I mean here, because the material objects are sometimes visual equivalents, smaller versions, almost "toys", of the objects or shrines themselves ; in other cases they "stand for" the denota in a very precise way, and sometimes less precisely.
Clearly people do not go to a diviner "by heart", as West African English has it (i.e. for nothing), since the outcome always involves a loss, usually the loss of an animal. They go because they are suffering from a misfortune, or anticipate one, and because such "mystical trouble"
is dealt with by recourse to a diviner who in turn usually tells the subject to approach a certain shrine and perform a certain sacrifice (in the more restricted sense of the word). This procedure is known as maale bagr, to repair the mystical wrong. I use the word "mystical"
here simply to point to the fact that the solution is deemed to be through an altar, the locus of contacting a type of agency (or divinity) that I call divine or supernatural, for the sake of convenience and communication.
So sacrifice (in the inclusive sense) usually involves :
The sacrificial sequence 1. a condition of misfortune on the part of one or more people who decide upon :
2. consultation of diviner 3. who points to an altar / divinity (never to God who has no altar, though this situation is not entirely static (Goody 1977 Sacrifice among the LoDagaa and elsewhere : a comparative comment 13 the offering of cultivated plants, is only part of totality, which is the rite or ceremony. For the LoDagaa, the other phases carry much weight, even though the characteristic act is the communion between man and god at the altar. There is the gathering of the participants and more especially the principals (the donors and the intermediaries), especially the sacrificer, as well as the object of sacrifice.
The approach to the altar is followed by the performance of acts of address, gestural (involving the body), manipulative (with objects), but above all verbal. Since there is some danger of the gesture being swamped by the parole (especially in the discussion of sacrifice), it is worth commenting that even if one is enquiring into intention, motive or goal, or into ideas or systems of thought, one of these elements is no less sound an index than any other ; indeed the different channels may carry contradictory messages, as one writes a letter of apology but acts defiantly or defensively towards the rest of the world.
"Confirmation" refers to the attempt to make certain that the diviner's diagnosis of the cause of misfortune is correct ; otherwise an offering is made for nothing. Often the form that confirmation takes is the slaughter of a chicken, whose posture, favourable (dying on its back) or unfavourable (dying on its belly), is held to be an answer to the question posed. It is a form of divination interior to the sacrificial sequence.
The offering is the sacrificing of the animal, the handing over of the cooked foods, the donation of the produce of the fields, the libation of beer or the pouring of water. Among the LoDagaa, the sac rificial animal is a chicken, guinea fowl, goat, sheep, dog or cow, never a horse or donkey. The offering is followed by the disposal of the edibles among men and gods, the drinking of beer, the butchering of the animal, the cooking there and then of certain portions of the meat, the formal allocation of the remainder to specified individuals and categories, which precedes the final dispersal of the participants, bearing their allotted portions of the sacrifice.
It should also be said that the word bagr (in the context of maala bagr) can be used of regular offerings to the gods, for example at the Gonja, a former kingdom in the savannah north of Ashanti. I say "within" Gonja because while Islam was in a certain sense the (or a) state religion, it was exclusively practised only by members of the Muslim estate ; the ruling and commoner estates were more eclectic.
In Islam one does not offer blood sacrifices to God ; and there is only one God. Even food offerings are not made. But food is given to the poor in the name of God, not only in the minor form of bean cakes to children among the Gonja but also in the more substantial form of food-kitchens and ecclesiastical property in those remarkable building clusters (markets, hospitals, schools and poor-houses) that surround the great mosque at Bursa, the old Ottoman capital, and other major mosques in the Middle East.
But meat is eaten, both on ceremonial and other occasions and therefore blood has to flow. At the festival of Dongi, each family tries to buy a sheep which is killed in a formal,"sacrificial" way, and the blood is mixed with earth, which is then made into round balls There is, then, a progressive decrease in blood offerings. In some world religions, which are also literate religions, there is not only avoidance of blood sacrifice, but rejection of meat altogether, at least in holy contexts or by holy men. In effect, an increase of asceticism, a rejection of the more concrete aspects of god-man communi cation, occured long before the recent process of secularisation that has been extensively explored by historians of religion. It was re lated to the stratification which is also, in crude terms, an evolution of religion. The attitude is only one of the several possibilities in this society, as the code-making ethnographer only too easily forgets. But it shows that a certain recognition of contradiction does exist, a recognition that man-god communication has its humorous side (a friend bursts out laughing when this point is reached). The account comes from that very special source, the recitation of the Bagre, in which we find other comments upon the deceptiveness of sacrifice, for at one point, when man is attempting by means of sacrifice to communicate with God, whose role is emphasized throughout, a being of the wild intervenes in a cloud of dust and turns the chicken up the other way, giving man the incorrect answer (Goody 1972) . In the present extract the theme is different, showing the humorous rather than the deceptive side of sacrifice. It is the Earth shrine that is speaking to God. But in fact we've strayed from the path of God, the path of knowledge.
HIGH
It is this attitude that makes conversion to a non-sacrificial religion an ever-present possibility.
